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INTRODUCTION

The theme of this symposium is the relationship between
environmental ethics and public policy. Others have discussed whether
a unique set of ethical principles underlies environmental law, and the
extent to which environmental ethics are explicitly referred to in judicial
decisions or legislative debates.! This article focuses on one important
vehicle for giving concrete content to ethical norms in the
implementation of environmental law and policy - the movement to
achieve environmental justice.
As I argue below, in many ways the central premise of the
environmental justice movement is to provide a stronger ethical
direction for environmental law. Viewed another way, the movement
represents an ethical challenge to the existing environmental regulation
paradigm.
Part I of this Article provides brief background on the environmental
justice movement. Part 11 generally describes some of the challenges that
environmental justice principles pose for the traditional environmental
decision-making paradigm. Part III presents several specific examples of
how environmental justice norms can be incorporated to improve the
ethical outcomes of traditional agency decision making.
I. WHAT IS ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE?

Broadly speaking, environmental justice refers to a political and social
movement to address the disparate distribution of environmental harms
and benefits in our society, and to reform the processes of environmental
decision making so that all affected communities have a right to
meaningful participation. Its roots lie in diverse political efforts: the
civil rights movement, organizing efforts of Native Americans and labor,
the traditional environmental movement, and perhaps most importantly,
the local grass roots anti-toxics movement of the 1980s. Local in origin,
the movement grew to national prominence in the late 1980s and early
1990s as local organizations formed regional environmental justice
networks, the empirical evidence of environmental injustice mounted,
and activists came together in 1991 for the First National People of Color
Leadership Summit.
1 Alyson Flournoy, Building an Environmental Ethic from the Ground Up, 37 U.c. DAVIS
L. REV. 53, simultaneously published in 27 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL'y J. 53; Christopher
Stone, Do Morals Matter? The Influence of Ethics on Courts and Congress in Shaping U.S.
Environmental Policies, 37 U.c. DAVIS L. REV. 13, simultaneously published in 27 ENVIRONS
ENVTL. L. & POL'y J. 13 (2003).
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Numerous studies show that a variety of environmental harms are
disproportionately located in low-income communities and communities
of color. These include hazardous waste Treatment, Storage and
Disposal Facilities (TSDFs), air pollutants, water pollutants, air toxics,
facilities that report under the Toxic Release Inventory (TRl) program,
lead-based paint hazards,
pesticide exposure,
occupational
environmental hazards, and others.2 Some emerging literature likewise
has documented disparities in environmental benefits, including parks
and open space, transportation funding, and enforcement of
3
environmental laws.
While arguments persist over whether these
disparities are the result of racial discrimination or economic forces, race
consistently has been shown to be a central explanatory factor (although
not the only one). Even when controlling for political, economic, and
other factors, studies show that race is a more important factor than
income. The studies are generally consistent over time, whether they
were conducted before 1992 (and thus typically analyzing just race and
class) or since then (and thus typically employing more sophisticated
multivariate models).4 While some commentators have suggested that
the inequitable distribution of noxious facilities is the result of
demographic changes that occur after unwanted land uses are sited in
communities,S the research to date provides little empirical support for

, See generally LUKE COLE & SHEILA FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND Ur: ENVIRONMENTAL
RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 167-183 (2000)
(providing annotated bibliography of studies that document and describe disproportionate
impact of environmental hazards by race and income); CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & EILEEN
GAUNA, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: LAW, POLICY AND REGULATION 55-76 (2002) (examining
evidence on issue of environmental discrimination).
3 See RECHTSCHAFFEN & GAUNA, supra note 2, at 78-85 (containing excerpts that look
at distribution of transportation funding, open space, and access to waterfront).
4
JAMES P. LESTER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES: MYTHS
AND REALmES 13-14 (2000). The authors also conducted their own very detailed study of a
range of environmental harms at different levels of analysis: the state, county, and city
level. The harms evaluated include air pollution (two measures), hazardous waste, solid
waste, toxic waste, water pollution (two measures), releases of Toxic Release Inventory
chemicals, and releases of lead. Their analysis shows a strong link between the percent
population that is African American and the extent of environmental harms, and a
significant, if less pronounced, link between the percent population that is Hispanic and
environmental harms. Social class, as measured by income and education, is less
significant than race as a predictor of where hazards are located. By contrast, the
researchers found that higher levels of political mobilization did not lead to lower levels of
environmental harms. [d. at 149-51.
5
Most prominently, Professor Vicki Been suggested that the poor and racial
minorities might move to neighborhoods that host a LULU (locally undesirable land use)
because those neighborhoods offered the cheapest available housing, while the siting of a
LULU may decrease the value of a neighborhood's property and the perceived quality of
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this theory. 6
Since the early 1990s, the environmental justice movement has
influenced the way many policymakers, academics, regulated entities,
affected communities, and others view environmental law and policy. In
1994, President Clinton issued an executive order mandating that all
federal agencies make achieving environmental justice part of their
mission. California adopted legislation in 1999 requiring similar actions
by state environmental agencies. Numerous other states and localities
have adopted environmental justice policies and guidances, or have
otherwise sought to consider environmental justice principles in carrying
out their functions.
What are some of the ethical norms and principles underlying the
environmental justice movement? The broadest, most aspirational
principles are those known as the Principles of Environmental Justice,7
adopted collectively by several hundred activists at the First National
People of Color Leadership Summit. Among other things, the Principles
declare the following:
The right of all species to be free from ecological destruction.

s

The right of environmental self-determination, and the full
9
participation of all peoples at all levels of decision making.

life in a neighborhood, causing those who can afford to move to do so. Vicki Been, Locally
Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?,
103 YALE L.J. l383, l385 (1994).
6
In Professor Been's own nationwide study of hazardous waste facilities, for example,
she found that neighborhoods surrounding the facilities did not become poorer or more
heavily minority after the siting occurred there. Vicki Been & Francis Gupta, Coming to the
Nuisance or Going to the Barrios? A Longitudinal Analysis of Environmental Justice Claims, 24
ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 27-30 (1997). Another nationwide study of hazardous waste facilities
reached similar results. See also John Michael Oakes et al., A Longitudinal Analysis of
Environmental Equity in Communities with Hazardous Waste Facilities, 25 SOc. ScI. REs. 125,
147 (1996) (suggesting that placement of TSDFs have not increased percentage of minority
composition in communities surrounding them).
7
Principles of Environmental Justice, in PROCEEDINGS: THE FIRST NATIONAL PEOPLE OF
COLOR ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERSHIP SUMMIT xiii, xiii (Oct. 24-27, 1991).
8
See id. ("1. Environmental justice affirms the sacredness of Mother Earth, ecological
unity and the interdependence of all species, and the right to be free from ecological
destruction.").
9
See id. ("5. Environmental justice affirms the fundamental right to political,
economic, cultural and environmental self-determination of all peoples.... 7.
Environmental justice demands the right to participate as equal partners at every level of
decision making including needs assessment, planning, implementation, enforcement and
evaluation.").
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That past and current producers of pollutants should be held strictly
JO
accountable for cleaning up contamination that they have caused.
That principles of informed consent should be strictly enforced.

ll

The right of all workers to a safe and healthy work environment,
without being forced to choose between an unsafe livelihood and
12
unemployment.
The right to a healthy natural world for future generations, and a
13
sustainable planet for humans and other living things.
A more academic approach to understanding the ethical principles
underlying environmental justice has been developed by Professor
14
Robert Kuehn. In his "taxonomy of environmental justice," Professor
Kuehn identifies four types of "justice" that are embodied in
environmental justice: distributive justice, procedural justice, corrective
ls
justice, and social justice.
Distributive justice refers to the equitable distribution of
environmental burdens from risk-producing facilities and environmental
16
benefits from government and private programs.
This largely

10
See id. ("6. Environmental justice demands the cessation of the production of all
toxins, hazardous wastes, and radioactive materials, and that all past and current
producers be held strictly accountable to the people for detoxification and the containment
at the point of production.").
II
See id. at xiv ("13. Environmental justice calls for the strict enforcement of principles
of informed consent, and a halt to the testing of experimental reproductive and medical
procedures and vaccinations on people of color.").
12
See id. ("8. Environmental justice affirms the right of all workers to a safe and
healthy work environment, without being forced to choose between an unsafe livelihood
and unemployment. It also affirIns the right of those who work at home to be free from
environmental hazards.").
13
See id. at xiii, xiv ("3. Environmental justice mandates the right to ethical, balanced
and responsible uses of land and renewable resources in the interest of a sustainable planet
for humans and other living things .... 17. Environmental justice requires that we, as
individuals, make personal and consumer choices to consume as little of Mother Earth's
resources and to produce as little waste as possible, and make the conscious decision to
challenge and reprioritize our lifestyles to insure the health of the natural world for present
and future generations.").
14
Robert R. Kuehn, A Taxonomy of Environmental Justice, 30 ENVTL. 1. REp. 10,681

(2000).
15

ld. at 10,68l.

Professor Shrader-Frechette argues that geographic considerations alone are "not
morally relevant grounds for detennining who ought to receive disproportionate
environmental impacts. . .. There is no morally relevant reason (e.g., merit, need) that
where people live should provide sufficient grounds for discriminating against them. Such
16
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geographic conception is the one that probably comes to most people's
minds when they hear the term "environmental justice." It is a
misconception, however, that a primary goal of the environmental justice
movement is to geographically redistribute environmentally hazardous
facilities. A more accurate understanding of the desire for distributive
justice is that if the burdens of harmful land uses are more equitably
shared, this will create greater pressure to reduce pollution throughout
society.
Procedural justice refers to fairness in the decision-making process,
including the right of all members of the public to meaningful
17
participation in all aspects of agency decisions.
Corrective justice refers to fairness in punishment, including the duty
to compensate losses for which one is responsible, and to clean up
contamination that one has caused.
Social justice encompasses the idea of a more just ordering of society,
in which all persons have their needs more fully met. In this view,
environmental justice is part and parcel of the larger problems of racial,
social, and economic injustice facing heavily burdened communities.
Advocates note that the same underlying racial, political, and economic
factors that cause disproportionate environmental harms also are
responsible for poor housing, poor quality schools, lack of employment
opportunities, and other problems in many communities. In tum, the
presence of risky and undesirable land uses undermines neighborhood
health and vitality, and leads to economic degradation.
Policymakers and legislators have sought to capture these principles in
specific definitions and mandates. President Clinton's Executive Order
on Environmental Justice (Exec. Order No. 12,898) directs each federal
agency "[t]o greatest extent practicable and permitted by law ... [to]
make achieving environmental justice part of its mission by identifying
and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse
human health or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and
activities on minority populations and low-income populations."ls

discrimination instead seems to serve the interests of expediency, of using humans as means
to some commercial or industrial end." KRISTIN SHRADER-FRECHETIE, ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE: CREATING EQUALITY, RECLAIMING DEMOCRACY 33 (2002) (emphasis in original).
17 Professor Kaswan terms this prong of justice "political justice" because, in her view,
the issue goes beyond the question of procedure to the substance of the deliberative
process. That is, procedures that merely ensure the fair participation of all groups in the
decision-making process, but that do not necessarily lead to decisions that are more
responsive to public opinion, do not achieve what she describes as "political justice." Alice
Kaswan, Distributive Justice and the Environment, 81 N.C. L. REv. 1031, 1045-47 (2003).
18
Exec. Order No. 12898,59 Fed. Reg. 7,629 (Feb. 16, 1994).
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EPA also has defined environmental justice as:
[T]he fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people
regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to
the development, implementation, and enforcement of
environmental laws, regulations, and policies. Fair treatment means
that no group of people, including a racial, ethnic, or a
socioeconomic group, should bear a disproportionate share of the
negative environmental consequences resulting from industrial,
municipal, and commercial operations or the execution of federal,
Meaningful
state, local, and tribal programs and policies.
involvement means that:
(1) potentially affected community
residents have an appropriate opportunity to participate in
decisions about a proposed activity that will affect their
environment and/or health; (2) the public's contribution can
influence the regulatory agency's decision; (3) the concerns of all
participants involved will be considered in the decision-making
process; and (4) the decision makers seek out and facilitate the
involvement of those potentially affected. 19
At the state level, California has adopted legislation mandating that
the California Environmental Protection Agency (Cal/EPA) promote the
enforcement. of health and environmental statutes and conduct its
programs and policies "in a manner that ensures the fair treatment of
20
people of all races, cultures, and income levels."
Cal/EPA is also
required to develop a model environmental justice mission statement for
its constituent departments.21
New York's environmental agency
recently adopted a policy enhancing public participation (and other)
requirements in the permitting process for projects in environmental
justice areas.
The policy also incorporates environmental justice
19
See U.s. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENVmONMENTAL JUSTICE, available at
http:// www.epa.gov / compliance / environmentaljustice / index.html (last visited Sept. 26,
2003). In a 2001 memo reaffirming EPA's commitment to environmental justice, EPA
Administrator Christine Whitman elaborated that "[e]nvironmental justice is achieved
when everyone, regardless of race, culture, or income, enjoys the same degree of protection
from environmental and health hazards and equal access to the decision-making process to
have a healthy environment in which to live, learn, and work." Memoranda from Christine
Whitman on EPA's Commitment to Environmental Justice (August 9,2001) (emphasis in
original), available at http://www.epa.gov /Compliance/resources/policies/ ej/ admin_ej
_commiUetter_081401.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2003).
'" CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 71110(b), (c) (West 2003).
21
[d. § 71111. The statute defines environmental justice as "the fair treatment of people
of all races, cultures, and incomes with respect to the development, adoption,
implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies." CAL.
GOV'T. CODE § 65040.12(e) (West 2003).
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concerns into some aspects of the agency's enforcement program, grants
program and public participation provisions. Closely following EPA's
definition, the policy defines environmental justice as "the fair treatment
and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, or
income with respect to the development, implementation, and
enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies.,,22 A
number of other states have adopted similar definitions in their
23
environmental justice policies.
As is clear from the above, environmental justice norms have not only
attracted Significant national attention, but they have also been
recognized by policymakers in the form of legislative enactments, agency
policies, and formal agency definitions. The next challenge is to translate
these admittedly broad and aspirational principles into concrete agency
actions.
II. How ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE POSES CHALLENGES TO ENVIRONMENTAL
DECISION MAKING

In large measure, the traditional environmental regulatory scheme has
24

ignored distributional issues. Rather, most environmental regulation
has been premised on largely utilitarian principles of achieving the
22
The policy provides that "fair treatment means that no group of people, including a
racial, ethnic, or socioeconomic group, should bear a disproportionate share of the negative
environmental consequences resulting from industrial, municipal, and commercial
operations or the execution of federal, state, local, and tribal programs and policies." See
N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, CP-29 ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND
PERMlTIING (March 19, 2003), available at http://www.dec.state.ny.us/website/ej/ejpolicy
.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2003).
23
See, e.g., IJ'.TIIANA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE STRATEGIC PLAN (2001) (providing in its Vision Statement, "No citizens or
communities of the State of Indiana, regardless of race, color, national origin, income, or
geographic location, will bear a disproportionate share of the risk and consequences of
environmental pollution or will be denied equal access to environmental benefits."); RHODE
ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY
POLICY (Jan. 7, 2001) (providing "[flor purposes of this policy, environmental equity means
that no person or particular group of persons suffers disproportionately from
environmental degradation or intentional discrimination, or is denied enjoyment of a fair
share of environmental improvements."), cited in Nicholas Targ, Three Paths to the
Environmental Justice Goal: Social Capital, Going Beyond Meaningful Public Participation (on
file with author). According to Targ, over the past decade thirty-five states have
established authorities or undertaken initiatives of one kind or another to address
environmental justice issues. Id.
24
See, e.g., Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Participation and the
Paradigm Paradox, 17 STAN. ENVfL. L.J. 3, 9-11 (1998); Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing
"Environmental Justice": The Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L.
REV. 787, 792-96, 811-22 (1993).
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greatest good for the greatest number in society. Environmental law has
not been overtly concerned with whether the distribution of
environmental harms is fair, whether there is an equitable match
between individuals who bear the costs and those who reap the benefits,
or whether it is unjust to impose incremental risks on populations
already bearing disproportionate environmental and health risks (since
few regulatory regimes mandate consideration of cumulative risk).
For example, as Professor Eileen Gauna argues, the "interest
representation" or "pluralism" model that characterizes most
administrative decision making treats all the interests (preferences) of
participating stakeholders as equal. Those advocating protection of the
environment, or fairness in who bears the risks of a proposed action, are
not entitled to any special consideration. The task of the agency
regulator is to ascertain what the collectively expressed preferences of
stakeholders are in what amounts to a surrogate legislative process.2S
Moreover, important trends in environmental regulation have the
potential to exacerbate environmental inequities. One is the growing
popularity of market-based incentives, including tradeable emission
credits, as a means to promote more cost-effective regulation. EPA, for
instance, recently adopted a trading policy for water pollutant
26
discharges.
Tradeable credits also are the centerpiece of the Bush
Administration's "Clear Skies" proposal for regulating power plant
27
emissions.
Few if any trading systems explicitly protect against the
creation of hot spots, which, when they occur are likely to di~arately
burden low-income communities and communities of color.
Most
problematic are the trading programs that allow trading between mobile
and stationary sources of air pollution, and cross-pollutant trading. For
example, Rule 1610, the so-called "car-scrapping program" in the South
Coast Air Quality Management District, allowed stationary source
polluters to avoid pollution-control equipment by purchasing pollution
credits generated by destroying old, high-polluting cars. Experience
with the program showed that while the stationary sources that
purchased credits and avoided pollution controls were located in

Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit, supra note 24 at 19-26.
U.s. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FINAL WATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY Gan. 13,2003),
available at http://www.epa.gov / owow / watershed / trading/ finalpolicy2003.htInl (last
updated Apr. 4, 2003).
27 See
U.s.
ENVTL.
PROT.
AGENCY,
CLEAR
SKIES,
available
at
http://www.epa.gov /clearskies/ (last updated Sept. 8,2003).
28
See Stephen M. Johnson, Economics vs. Equity: Do Market-Based Environmental Reforms
Exacerbate Environmental Injustice?, 56 WASH. & LEE 1. REv. 111, 129-131 (Winter 1999).
25
26
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communities that were overwhelmingly people of color, the benefits
from car scrapping were felt over the entire metropolitan Los Angeles
29
region, which is only 36 percent people of color.
The current Administration, as well as critics of environmental
regulation, also has been strongly pressing for greater reliance on cost30
benefit analysis. Virtually all cost-benefit analyses, however, examine
net societal benefits and weigh them against net societal costs, without
disaggregating which populations are experiencing the benefits and
31
costS. Moreover, to "monetize" the benefits achieved by a proposed
regulation, economists often use contingent valuation surveys, asking
the affected population how much they would be willing to pay for
environmental or health benefits. These surveys contain an inherent bias
against poor communities and individuals who are likely to express less
"willingness to pay" to avoid environmental harms, simply because they
have fewer resources. A standard cost-benefit analysis, therefore, tends
to justify imposing greater environmental burdens on poor communities
32
than on their wealthier counterparts.
Similar issues arise with respect to the quantitative risk assessment
and comparative risk assessment processes, on which cost-benefit
analyses and many regulatory decisions are based. Quantitative risk

29
Richard Toshiyuki Drury, et al., Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los
Angeles' Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'y F. 231, 251-55
(Spring 1999).
30 Cost-benefit analysis is mandated by only a few environmental statutes. See SIDNEY
A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RIsK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC
APPROACH 40 (2003). However, Executive Order No. 12,866 requires federal agencies to
prepare cost-benefit analyses for all "major" regulations (those with an annual economic
impact of $100 million or more). Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993). The
Bush Administration's Office of Management and Budget has stated that its policy is to
"implement vigorously the principles and procedures" in the Executive Order.
Memorandum from John D. Graham on Presidential Review of Agency Rulemaking by
OIRA [Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs] (Sept. 20, 2001) available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov /omb / inforeg/ oira_review-process.htrnl (last visited Sept. 4,
2003).
31
LISA HEINZERLING AND FRANK ACKERMAN, PRICING THE PRICELESS: COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 23 (Georgetown Envtl. L. & pory Inst. 2002).
As another scholar puts it: "Since a cost-benefit analysis of a toxic pollution problem
typically does not support protecting all persons (because the marginal costs will be too
high), cost-benefit analysis is incompatible with the goals of environmental justice. Costbenefit analysis and its philosophic ancestor, utilitarianism, compared with environmental
justice are simply two different and incompatible views for addressing the problems of
guiding exposures to toxic substances." Carl F. Cranor, Risk Assessment, Susceptible
Subpopulations, and Environmental Justice, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 328
(Michael Gerrard ed., 1999).
32 HEINZERLING & ACKERMAN, supra note 31, at 23-24.
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assessments attempt to quantify the probability of an adverse effect
occurring because of exposure to a given hazard, for instance, the
likelihood of residents developing cancer because they live adjacent to a
benzene-emitting factory. Comparative risk assessments are used to
rank environmental problems by their seriousness or relative risk. Risk
assessments typically consider aggregate effects, such as total population
33
risk, and downplay or fail to consider how these are distributed.
Additionally, as discussed below, risk assessments often fail to evaluate
adequately the risks of especially vulnerable or highly exposed
populations. Moreover, as Professor Sheila Foster notes, the riskassessment and subsequent risk-management processes often do not
afford affected communities a meaningful role, despite the numerous
34
subjective judgments and value choices inherent in the processes.
Having depicted in broad-brush strokes some of the inherent tensions
between environmental justice principles and traditional environmental
regulation, this Article next presents several concrete scenarios to
illustrate how conflicts of this type may be resolved in a fairer and more
ethical manner.
III. How ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE NORMS CAN BE USED TO IMPROVE THE
ETHICAL OUTCOMES OF AGENCY DECISION MAKING

Disparities in environmental protection have occurred in a variety of
regulatory contexts: the formulation of broad policy; the setting of
environmental standards; permitting and land-use decisions; clean up of
contaminated sites; and enforcement of environmental requirements.
Thus, there are numerous ways in which environmental decision making

33
Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of
Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562,592-604 (1992).
34
See Sheila R. Foster, Meeting the Environmental Justice Challenge: Evolving Norms in
Environmental Decisionmaking, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,992, 10,999 (2000). Among other things,
comparative risk assessment focuses on the probability of risk occurring and does not
consider the qualitative components of risk - social, psychological, moral, and emotional
- that are important to how the public evaluates risk. In a related vein, Professor
Catherine O'Neill has pointed out the growing tendency among environmental decision
makers to rely on strategies of risk avoidance - in which those who bear risks are asked to
change their behavior to avoid environmental harm rather than risk-reduction strategies
that require risk producers to reduce harm. Examples include fish and wildlife
consumption advisories warning anglers not to fish in contaminated waters; plantgathering restrictions; and air quality alerts. She notes that the burden of undertaking
avoidance is likely to fall most heavily on communities of color, low-income communities,
and indigenous peoples, who are disproportionately among the most exposed to
environmental hazards. Catherine O'Neill, Risk Avoidance, Cultural Discrimination, and
Environmental Justice for Indigenous Peoples, 30 ECOL. L. Q. 1,2-3 (2003).
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can be changed to incorporate environmental justice principles. This
section briefly discusses four specific examples.

A. Reforming Standard Setting
Standards are the foundation upon which many regulatory
requirements rest. Many environmental standards are health-based,
expressed by the ambient amount of a pollutant that is safe. Many
health-based standards fail to adequately protect certain subpopulations,
particularly those that are especially vulnerable to environmental harms
or those who are more heavily exposed to pollutants than the average
individual.
One reason for this failure is the manner in which the risk assessments
underlying many standards are carried out. Risk assessments generally
utilize "a seventy-kilogram male with the general biology of a
Caucasian, as a so-called reference man, in developing dose-response
predictions and assume that this reference man is an apgropriate
surrogate for minorities, as well as women and children."
They
typically fail to consider variability in the response of humans to
36
different levels of pollution. Moreover, most risk assessments evaluate
the risks of a single proposed activity (or exposure to a single chemical),
without considering the total risks that persons face from cumulative
exposures, or the s~ergistic risks from the interaction of multiple
3
pollutant exposures. In addition, standards often are based on average
exposure levels to a regulated substance, as opposed to the levels
experienced by the most highly exposed populations.
These limitations in the traditional standard-setting process are
illustrated in the following three examples.
1. Water Quality Standards

Under the Clean Water Act, water quality standards are set by EPA
and the states to protect water bodies for certain designated uses,

J5 Robert
R. Kuehn, The Environmental Justice Implications of Quantitative Risk
Assessment, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 103, 12S (1996).
36 As Professor Kuehn notes, "[t)here is a high degree of variability in the response of
humans to different levels of pollution. Age, lifestyle, genetic background, sex, ethnicity,
and race may all play an important role in enhancing the susceptibility of persons to
environmentally related disease. Studies have shown human variability of more than 1000fold in drug metabolism and between 3- and ISO-fold in the carcinogenic metabolism of
various chemicals." Id. at 122.
'7 Id. at 117-18.
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including swimming, recreation, and fish consumption. Traditionally,
EPA assumed a fish consumption rate of 6.5 grams per day when setting
water quality standards. This amount, based on market surveys of the
general population conducted in the 1970s, presumed consumption of
38
approximately one eight-ounce fish meal per month.
As Professor Catherine O'Neill has documented, Native Americans
and other subpopulations consume far greater quantities of fish than the
general population. Studies of fish consumption rates in the Pacific
Northwest, for example, indicate that the mean consumption rate for
Native Americans in these areas ranges from approximately 60 to 80
grams per day; individuals at the 95th percentile of consumption eat
approximately five times that amount, between 205 and 280 grams per
day.39
Studies of other groups show similar rates, for instance
documenting the 90th percentile fish consumption rate at 225 grams per
day for urban fishers on Los Angeles Bay, 242 grams per day for Asian
and Pacific Islander communities in Kings County, Washington, and 489
40
grams per day for the Suquamish Indian Tribe. As a result, Native
Americans and other subgroups can experience risks significantly
greater than those faced by the general population from consuming
contaminated fish, in some cases, cancer risks of 1 x 10-4 (or higher) as
compared to 1 x 10-6 (or lower) for the general population. 41 Critics note
that the problems resulting from underestimates of fish consumption
have been compounded by the fact that EPA's water quality standards
traditionally failed to take into account the actual level of bioaccumulation of contaminants in fish.42 EPA has defended water quality
standards resulting in these disparate levels of protection as providing a
"lower yet adequate" protection for higher-consuming subpopulations,
43
an argument upheld by the Ninth Circuit.

38
Catherine A. O'Neill, Variable Justice: Environmental Standards, Contaminated Fish, and
"Acceptable" Risk to Native Peoples, 19 STAN. ENVTL. 1.J. 3,43-44 (2000) [hereinafter O'Neill,
Variable Justice).
39
Id. at 50-53.

" NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNCIL, FISH CONSUMPTION AND
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, A REPORT DEVELOPED FROM THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNCIL MEETING OF DECEMBER 3-6, 2001, 27, available at
http:// www.epa.gov / compliance / resources / publications / ej / fish_consump _report_II 02.
pdf (last visited Sept. 24,2003) [hereinafter NEJAC).
41
O'Neill, Variable Justice, supra note 38, at 55-57, 62-64.
42
Barry E. Hill & Nicholas Targ, The Link Between Protecting Natural Resources and the
Issue of Environmental Justice, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. 1. REV. I, 11 (2000).
43
Dioxin/Organochlorine Ctr. v. Clarke, 57 F.3d 1517, 1524 (9th Cir. 1995).
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More recently, EPA has revised its methodology for setting water
quality standards to incorporate a higher national default fish
consumption rate of 17.5 grams per day for the general population and
44
recreational fishers and 142.4 grams/day for subsistence fishers.
However, many state water quality standards currently in effect are still
4S
based on the old 6.5 grams per day standard.
Moreover, the new
standard is still inadequate to protect higher-consuming subpopulations,
even though, as a report by the National Environmental Justice Advisory
Council noted, "consumption at these rates may reflect the very practices
that these affected groups would want to see perpetuated and protected
for cultural, traditional, religious, economic, and other reasons.,,46
2. Farm Worker Entry Restrictions
Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide & Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),
EPA sets entry restrictions for farm workers, provisions that require a
waiting period between pesticide application and worker reentry into
the fields. As explained by Professor Gauna, in setting the reentry
intervals, EPA assumed a default body weight appropriate for adults,
154 pounds, unless there is potential harm to fetal development, in
which case the default weight is 132 pounds, the average weight of
women during childbearing years. The youngest legal farm workers,
however, are only twelve years old, and have a median weight of only
47
100 pounds. The default weight - and resulting standard - is even
less appropriate for children younger than twelve, yet farm worker
parents often take their preschool children (some of them infants) into
the fields with them due to lack of day care services, a fact known to
" Methodology for Deriving Ambient Water Quality Criteria for the Protection of Human
Health (Oct. 2000), available at http://www.epa.gov /waterscience/humanhealth/
method/method.html (last visited Sept. 24,2003).
45
NEJAC, supra note 40, at 34.
46
Id. at 28. According to the NEJAC report, anglers consuming at the maximum rates
documented in some communities - 1453.6 grams per day (Suquamish Indian Tribe);
182.3 grams per day (Laotian communities in West Contra Costa County, California); 391.4
grams per day (the Squaxin Island and Tulalip tribes); and 972 grams per day (four
Columbia River tribes) - "would be grossly under protected by the new standard." Id.
47
Eileen Gauna, Farmworkers as an Environmental Justice Issue:
Similarities and
Differences, 25 ENVIRONS ENVTL 1. & POL'y 67, 69 (2002), citing U.s. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, PESTICIDES, IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF FARMWORKERS AND
THEIR CHILDREN, GAO/RCED-00-40, 19 (2000) [hereinafter GAO, PESTICIDES,
IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED]. EPA justified the 154/132-pound basis for the reentry period by
assuming that although twelve year olds were on average 100 pounds, their bodies have
less surface area and they perform less work, resulting in less physical contact with
pesticide-treated plants. Id.
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EPA. 48 Children are especially vulnerable to environmental hazards
because their systems are still developing, because they eat
proportionately more food, drink more fluids, and breathe more air than
adults, and because their behavior patterns, such as playing close to the
ground and hand-to-mouth activity, increases their exposure to
49
hazards.
The population affected by the entry standards is overwhelmingly
minority. Ninety percent of the approximately two million hired farm
50
workers in the United States are people of color. EPA estimated in 1999
that there were 10,000 to 20,000 incidents of physician-diagnosed
pesticide illnesses and injuries per ~ear in farm work, but acknowledges
that this is a serious underestimate. 1
3. Ambient Particulate Matter Standards in California
A final example involves the California Air Resources Board's (ARB)
recent effort to revise the state's ambient air standards for particulate
emissions. This example is noteworthy because the ARB failed to
recognize the distributional implications of its decision, despite having
just adopted a comprehensive environmental justice strategy that calls
for the agency to integrate environmental justice into all of its programs,
52
policies, and regulations.
Under California law, ambient air quality standards must be set at
levels that adequately protect the health of the ~ublic, including infants
and children, with an adequate margin of safety. 3 The ARB's staff report

.. [d .
•9
A recent EPA report concluded that children younger than two years face a 10-fold
risk of developing cancer when exposed to certain toxic substances (mutagens, which cause
cancer by damaging DNA), while children ages 2 to 15 have a risk three times that of adults
from exposure to these substances. Jennifer Lee, Agency Says Children's Risk is Higher for
Some Cancers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2003, at A19.
50 The majority are Chicanos, followed by Puerto Ricans, Caribbean blacks, and
African Americans. Ivette Perfecto & Baldemar Velasquez, Farm Workers: Among the Least
Protected, 18 EPA J. 13,14 (Mar.! Apr. 1992).
51
GAO, PESTICIDES, IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED, supra note 47, at 12. The GAO concluded
that comprehensive information on the occurrence of acute and chronic health effects for
farm workers due to pesticide exposure does not exist. [d. at 4.
52
See CAL. AIR RES. BD., POLICIES AND ACTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (2001),
available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/ch/programs/ej/ejpolicies.pdf (last updated May 5,
2003). A report by the National Academy of Public Administration suggested that the
ARB's policy may be the most comprehensive environmental justice plan in the country.
See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PuBLIC ADMINISTRATION, MODELS FOR CHANGE: EFFORTS BY
FOUR STATES TO ADDRESS ENVIRONMENTAL JuSTICE 96 (2002).
53 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39606(d)(2) (West 2003).
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on the proposed rule acknowledged that its proposed limits on PM 25
(particulate matter 2.5 microns or less) would still result in close to 3000
deaths and over 10,000 serious circulatory or respiratory illnesses each
year. 54 The report also recognized that "some communities continue to
experience higher exposures than others as a result of the cumulative
impacts of air pollution from multiple mobile and stationary sources and
thus may suffer a disproportionate level of adverse health effects.,,55
Community groups urged the ARB to adopt a more protective standard,
pointing out that the populations that will suffer disproportionately
from the ongoing particulate exposures are low-income people and
people of color, since they tend to live closer to factories, power plants,
56
congested highways, and other sources of particulate emissions.
Indeed, there is clear evidence that in California, as elsewhere, peorle of
5
color face higher than average exposure to harmful air pollutants. The
ARB refused to set a stricter standard, and it dismissed the
environmental justice concerns by contending that "[b]ecause ambient
air quality standards simply define clean air, all of California's

54
See CAL. AIR RES. BD., STAFF REPORT: PuBLIC HEARING TO CONSIDER AMENDMENTS
TO THE AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS FOR PARTICULATE MATTER AND SULFATES, at 9-21
to 9-22 tbls.9.4-9.5 (May 3, 2002) available at http://www.arb.ca.gov /research/aaqs/stdrs/pm-final/pm-fina1.htrn (last updated May 6, 2002) [hereinafter ARB STAFF REPORT].
55
Id. at 2-9.
56 Comments of Golden Gate University Environmental Law & Justice Clinic et aI., to
Cal. Air Resources Board, on Staff Report: Public Hearing to Consider Amendments to the
Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter and Sulfates 8,10 (June 18, 2002) (on
file with author).
57 For example, in 1990, the South Coast Air Quality Management District estimated
that 71% of African Americans and 50% of Latinos reside in areas with the most polluted
air, as contrasted with 34% of whites. ERIC MANN, L.A.'s LETHAL AIR: NEW STRATEGIES
FOR POLICY, ORGANIZING, AND ACTION 31 (1991). In the Los Angeles area, the average
cancer risk from air emissions is 35% greater for Latinos and 28% greater for Asian
Americans and African Americans than for whites, after controlling for income and
numerous other factors. Rachel Morello-Frosch, et aI., Environmental Justice and Southern
California'S "Riskscape": The Distribution of Air Toxics Exposures and Health Risks Among
Diverse Communities, 36 URBAN AFF. REV. 551, 565-70 (2001). In Los Angeles, moreover,
minority school children, particularly Latinos, are more likely to be in public schools
surrounded by heavily polluted air than other children (after controlling for other factors).
Manuel Pastor, Jr., et aI., Who's Minding the Kids? Pollution, Public Schools and Environmental
Justice in Los Angeles, 83 SOC. SCI. Q. 263, 264 (2002). The higher environmental risks faced
by these children of color have been shown partially to contribute to their lower academic
performance, even after controlling for factors such as percent of students on free lunches,
teacher quality, percent of English learners, and other explanatory variables. Rachel
Morello-Frosch, et aI., Integrating Environmental Justice and the Precautionary Principle in
Research and Policy Making: The Case of Ambient Air Toxic Exposures and Health Risks Among
Schoolchildren in Los Angeles, 584 ANNALS OF AMER. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 47, 52-57 (2002)
[hereinafter Morello-Frosch, Integrating Environmental Justice and the Precautionary Principle].
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communities will benefit from the proposed health-based standards, as
progress is made to attain the standards."s8
When agencies set standards knowing that they will result in
inadequate or lower protections for certain individuals or groups, the
decisions raise fundamental questions about fair treatment. In essence,
agencies are trading the health and safety of certain persons to lower
overall costs for regulated entities and to promote the general welfare.
As Professor Kristin Shrader-Frechette argues in her recent book on
environmental justice, however, permitting activities that benefit society
as a whole while imposing disparate environmental burdens on certain
subgroups requires special justification, for instance, that the activity
lead to greater long-term equality. 59 Otherwise, such discrimination
amounts to treating certain individuals merely as means to the ends of
60
others.
These concerns are magnified where the most highly exposed persons
are not "anonymously" distributed throughout the general population,
but are members of clearly identifiable subgroups, such as low-income
61
These
populations, people of color, and Native Americans.
subpopulations, as compared to the general population, are worse off
economically, have experienced and continue to experience
discrimination in housing, employment, and other areas, suffer greater
health problems, have less access to health care, and are exposed to
higher levels of pollution. Moreover, in the case of Native Americans,
insufficiently protective standards can threaten their cultural integrity,
which, for example, may depend on fish and fish consumption. 62

" ARB STAFF REPORT, supra note 54, at 2-9.
" SHRADER-FRECHETTE, supra note 16, at 26-27. Moreover, the burden of establishing
such justification should be on the party responsible for such differential burdens, since
"[n]ot to put this burden on the possible discriminator would be to encourage power,
rather than fairness, to determine treatment under the law." Id. at 27.
60 [d. at 91. She notes that "all justifications for unequal treatment must be based on
morally relevant considerations, if they are to be acceptable. If all humans have equal
rights and equal dignity, then people ought to respect others' moral autonomy. Such
respect means treating them as ends in themselves, and never merely as means to the ends
of others."
61
As Professor O'Neill notes, at this point agency decision makers are no longer
"debating identity-less, anonymous, statistical lives." Rather, they are "deciding with full
knowledge whom to protect. It involves nothing less than deciding, to paraphrase Annette
Baier, which harms to notice and on whom we will with good conscience impose death, or
risk of death." O'Neill, Variable Justice, supra note 38, at 74-75 (quoting Annette Baier,
Poisoning the Wells, in VALUES AT RrsK49, 51 (Douglas MacLean ed., 1986)).
62 Professor O'Neill explains that "[fjish, especially salmon, are necessary for the
survival of the native peoples of the Pacific Northwest, both as individuals and as a people.
O'Neill, Variable Justice, supra note 38, 5-6. Fish are crucial for native peoples' sustenance,
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Many decisions about where to set environmental standards come
down to questions of cost-effectiveness - what is the point at which the
marginal costs to regulated entities of increased controls become too
high to justify increased levels of protections? The ethical implications of
approving standards with knowledge that they will disproportionately
affect people of color or low-income communities have not been
squarely on the table, but they need to be. In short, environmental
justice principles must be directly incorporated into the standard-setting
process. For example, regulators should add an extra margin of safety to
water quality standards to ensure that poor communities of color and
Native Americans are not subject to heightened health risks when they
consume fish - rather than consigning these groups to a less protective
level of safety than the general population.
B. Incorporating the Precautionary Principle into Decision Making

Over the past decade or so, the precautionary principle has emerged as
an important framework for public policy. The precautionary principle
has different formulations, but at its core provides that when an activity
raises potential threats to the environment or human health,
precautionary measures should be taken even if there is scientific
uncertainty about those impacts. Important corollaries are that in such
situations, the party responsible for creating the risk should bear the
burden of proving that an action is safe and that a full range of
63
alternatives to the potentially harmful activity must be examined.
Several ethical notions support the precautionary principle. First, it is
fundamentally unfair to make the public bear the risks of uncertainty
associated with toxic chemicals and other risk-producing activities. As
Professor Robert Bullard has argued, the public, particularly heavily
affected communities, often lacks the resources to hire the lawyers,
expert witnesses, and doctors needed to prove harm. By contrast,
businesses that introduce toxic chemicals into the environment benefit
from their use, and are in the best position to prove their safety. Second,
it violates principles of personal autonomy and informed consent for
as a way to feed their family. Id. Fish are also crucial for subsistence, in the sense of a
culture or way of life with economic, spiritual, social, and physical dimensions - a way to
be Yakama, or to be Tulalip. Id. Salmon, especially, are central to the belief systems,
identities, and social relationships that define these peoples. Id.
63
See Wingspread Statement on the Precautionary Principle (Jan. 1998), cited in JOEL
nCKNER ET AL., THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN ACTION: A HANDBOOK, Appendix,
(Science and Environmental Health Network), available at http://www.sehn.org/rtfdocs
/handbook-rtf.rtf.
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people to be exposed to potentially harmful chemicals without being
informed of their risks. Finally, precautionary action, taken to avoid
unknown, long-term risks, is justified by the ethical obligations that
64
current generations have to future generations.
The roots of the precautionary principle lie in international law and
policy, where it has been integrated into a number of international
65
conventions and agreements. Elements of the precautionary approach
are also found to some degree in existing environmental statutes, i.e., the
Clean Air Act's mandate that ambient air quality standards be set at a
level requisite to protect the public health, allowing an "adequate margin
of safety.,,66 The precautionary principle has been criticized, however, as
a threat to technological progress,67 and as insufficiently determinate,
68
and failing to provide meaningful guidance to regulators. It is beyond
the scope of this article to delve into the larger debate about the
precautionary principle and how its contours should be defined.
Broadly speaking, however, greater reliance on the principle in
environmental decision making is desirable because it will help advance
the goals of the environmental justice movement, and hence improve the
ethical outcomes of environmental decisions.
64
As prominently articulated by Professor Edith Brown Weiss, intergenerational
equity requires each generation to pass the planet on in no worse condition than it received
it in and to provide equitable access to its resources and benefits. Edith Brown Weiss, Our
Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for the Environment, 84 AM. J. INT'L. L. 198,200
(1990).
65 These include the Rio Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development, the Bergen Declaration on Sustainable Development, the Maastricht
Treaty on the European Union, the Barcelona Convention, the Cartagena Protocol to the
Convention on Biodiversity, and the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change.
neKNER, ET AL., supra note 63, at Appendix.
66 42 U.s.c. § 7409(b) (2003).
" See, e.g., John S. Applegate, The Taming of the Precautionary Principle, 27 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL'y REV. 13, 15 (2002) ("Within the United States, senior government officials
and many prominent scholars vigorously oppose the precautionary principle, because they
see it as a replacement for the risk-based, science-dominated, cost-sensitive regulatory
structures that have come to characterize most of the world's sophisticated environmental
regimes. These regulatory regimes proceed from the view that economic expansion and
technological innovation are to be encouraged, because they increase overall social welfare,
including improved human and environmental health. In this view, the precautionary
principle offers an unwelcome and technically insupportable alternative.")
68 Christopher D. Stone, Is There a Precautionary Principle?, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,790,
10,792-99 (2001). Professor Stone argues that no single principle can encompass all of the
concerns that motivate caution in the face of potentially risk-producing activities. Id. John
Graham, Director of the Office of Information & Regulatory Affairs in the White House
Office of Management and Budget, recently said of the precautionary principle: "We
consider it to be a mythical concept, perhaps like a unicorn." Samuel Loewenberg,
Precaution is for Europeans, NY nMES, May 18, 2003, at § 4,14.
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At its core, the precautionary principle is designed to lead to overall
reductions in risk-producing activities. Currently, poor people and
people of color are exposed disproportionately to environmental
hazards, including hazards whose long-term effects are unknown, or are
otherwise of uncertain dimension.
Minorities and the poor
disproportionately bear the risks, for example, of exposure to pesticides,
of childhood lead poisoning, of chronic exposure to air pollutants, and of
exposure to a suite of toxic substances in the workplace. Reducing risky
activities will benefit populations who are most likely to bear the brunt
69
of environmental harms.
Consider, for example, the large gaps in our information about toxic
substances. We have introduced into commerce thousands of chemical
substances (EPA lists 75,000 chemicals in its Toxic Substances Control
Act (TSCA) inventory as having some toxic effects), yet we know very
70
little about the health effects of most of these chemicals. This is true
even for the 3,000 so-called high production volume chemicals (HPV),
those produced or imported in quantities of over one million pounds per
year. EPA found in 1998 that for 93 percent of the HPV chemicals, some
basic toxicity data necessary for a minimum understanding of a
chemical's toxicity is lacking. There is no basic toxicity data for 43
71
percent of HPV chemicals.
Consider also the case of lead. Lead
poisoning is widely regarded as the most serious environmental health
hazard facing children today.72 Moreover, children from poor families
are eight times more likely to be poisoned than those from higher income
families, and African-American children are five times more likely to be
73
poisoned than white children.
Knowledge about the full extent of
69
See generally, Morello-Frosch, Integrating Environmental Justice and the Precautionary
Principle, supra note 57, at 48, 60-62 (noting important overlapping goals of environmental

justice and precautionary principle and suggesting ways that two concepts could be better
integrated to protect health of poor communities of color).
70 ROBERT V. PERCNAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE AND
POLICY 375 (3d ed. 2000).
71
ENVT'L PROT. AGENCY, CHEMICAL HAZARD DATA AVAILABILITY STUDY (1998),
available at http://www.epa.gov/oppt/chemtest/hazchem.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2003).
The chemical industry'S own study of 3,000 HPV chemicals found very similar gaps in
basic toxicity information. See David Roe, Ready or Not: The Coming Wave of Toxic
Chemicals, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 623, 627-28 (2002).
72
Clifford Rechtschaffen, The Lead Poisoning Challenge: An Approach for California and
Other States, 21 HARV. ENvrL. 1. REV. 387, 387 (1997) (citing LEAD-BASED PAINT HAZARD
REDUCTION AND FINANCING TASK FORCE, PuTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER: CONTROLLING
LEAD HAZARDS IN THE NATION'S HOUSING, REPORT OF THE LEAD-BASED PAINT HAZARD
REDUCTION AND FINANCING TASK FORCE 2 (1995)) [hereinafter Rechtschaffen, Lead Poisoning

Challenge].
73

46 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITYWKLY. REP. 141 (1997).
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lead's toxicity, however, has only gradually emerged over an extended
period. The recognized safe level of lead in the United States has been
lowered dramatically over the last three decades, from blood-lead levels
of 60 micrograms per deciliter of blood in the mid-1960s, to the current
74
level of 10 micrograms per deciliter. Based on recent research, scientists
now believe that even this standard is too high, and that exposure to
levels below 10 micrograms can have a very significant impact on
75
intellectual development.
Environmental justice advocates thus have embraced the
precautionary principle as a means of reducing overall environmental
risk, particularly avoidable risk. Mary O'Brien has argued that the
assessment of alternatives mandated by following the precautionary
principle will allow "people to see the potential in the concept that no
risk is acceptable if there are better alternatives. This allows people to
move toward the next logical step: that unnecessary risks and damages
are unacceptable [and] indefensible.,,76
What does incorporating the precautionary principle into decision
making look like in practice? A few examples follow.
The Los Angeles Unified School District adopted, in March of 1999, a
77
policy requiring use of integrated pest management practices.
The
policy announces that implementation of the precautionary principle is
the district's long-term objective. Noting that no pesticide product is free
from risk or threat to human health, the policy states that "industrial
producers should be required to prove that their pesticide products
demonstrate an absence of the risks ... rather than requiring that the
government or the public prove that human health is being harmed.,,78
In the interim, the District will give non-chemical methods first
consideration when selecting appropriate pest control techniques and
79
will strive ultimately to eliminate the use of all chemical controls.
Another precautionary approach is exemplified by the Massachusetts
Toxic Use Reduction Act, passed in 1989. The act requires companies to
analyze their use of toxic chemicals and undergo a detailed planning

Rechtschaffen, Lead Poisoning Challenge, supra note 72, at 391-92.
75 Thomas H. Maugh, II, "Safe" Lead Levels Lower IQ in Children, Study Finds, L.A. DMES,
Apr. 17,2003, at AI.
74

76
MARY O'BRIEN, MAKING BEITER ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS: AN ALTERNATIVE TO
RISK ASSESSMENT 213 (2000).
77
See http://www.calisafe.org/policy.htm (last visited June 1, 2003).

" Id.
79 Id.
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process aimed at identifying options for reducing chemical use.
Companies are required to measure their progress yearly and to make
this information available to the public. Firms are not required to take
any specific action; but from 1990 to 1995, companies in the state
nonetheless dramatically reduced their toxic chemical emissions by more
than two-thirds, their total chemical waste by 30 percent, and their total
81
use b y 20 percent.
San Francisco's Environment Commission recently established a goal
of having all city departments implement the precautionary principle.
To implement this objective, in August 2003, the Board of Supervisors
adopted a preferential purchasing ordinance. The measure requires the
city to develop a list of products that have "lesser impacts" on human
health and the environment compared to other, similar products, and to
82
give preference to purchasing these products.
Another example is the European Union's recently adopted Chemicals
83
Legislation. The legislation implements a mandatory registration and
testing process for over 30,000 new and existing chemicals produced in
significant quantities, in explicit recognition of the lack of knowledge
about the dangers of many chemicals on the market. Among other
things, producers will be required to provide information on the intrinsic
properties and hazards of each substance; the use for which it is
intended and potential exposure scenarios; resulting human health and
environmental risks; and a statement on how the producer or user is
84
managing the risks associated with the use of the substance.
Substances with certain hazardous characteristics, including those that
are carcinogenic, mutagenic, cause reproductive effects, or are persistent
85
organic pollutants, will require government approval prior to use. The
policy consciously sets out to place a greater onus on industry to
86
demonstrate the safety of their products. As the EU explains, under
previous law, '"[t]he burden of proof' is on the authorities: they need to
prove that a use of a chemical substance is unsafe before they may

O'BRIEN, supra note 76, at 155-60.
TICKNER, ET AL., supra note 63, at 6-7.
82
See San Francisco, Cal., Precautionary Principle Ordinance (August 2003), available at
http:// sfgov .orgl sfenvironment/ aboutus I policy Ilegislationl precaution_principle.htrn
(last visited Sept. 24, 2003).
83 Available at http://europa.eu.int/ cornml enterprise I chemicals I chempol
Iwhitepaper I reach.htrn (last visited June 2, 2003).
84 Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
80
81
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impose restrictions."s7 Under the new policy, "[t]he 'burden of proof' is
on the industry. It has to be able to prove that the way it intends to use a
chemical substance is safe. All actors in the supply chain will be obliged
to assess and implement measures to ensure the safety of the chemical
substances they handle."ss
In this country, the onus remains on government agencies to prove
that chemicals are unsafe before they can be regulated.
The
precautionary approach, however, could be employed to remedy our
large data gap about toxic chemicals, by shifting the burden of proof to
chemical producers to demonstrate the safety of toxic chemicals. For
example, with respect to any HPV chemical for which we do not have a
full suite of toxicity information, Congress could mandate that producers
disclose the absence of such information, or, alternatively, that
production decrease by a certain percentage annually until and unless
89
this information is developed.
While many other applications of the precautionary principle are
possible, the examples above illustrate how policies that consciously
advance environmental justice principles can improve the ethical
outcomes of environmental decision making.
C. Reforming Land Use Decisions
In part, the inequitable distribution of environmental hazards is the
result of land use regulation and zoning practices, some historical, some
90
ongoing.
For example, as Professor Tony Arnold documented in a

81
See http://europa.eu.int/ rapidl startl cgil guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gt&doc=
MEMO 103/99101 RAPID&lg=EN&display= (last visited Sept. 26,2003).
88
Id.
89 David Roe has suggested that the "legal privileges" enjoyed by chemicals sold in
commerce could be progressively withdrawn if the chemicals lack basic toxicity
information. Examples of progressive steps might include a requirement to be tested under
TSCA; automatic reclassification as a "new" chemical under TSCA, thereby making it
subject to stricter requirements than those applicable for existing chemicals; and automatic
forfeiture of confidentiality claims related to a chemical. Roe has described these and
similar ideas as "ignorance-based" controls - that is, the level of controls imposed on toxic
substances increases when we are ignorant about their effects. Roe, supra note 71, at 639-41.
90 These include racially restrictive covenants, urban renewal policies, exclusionary
zoning, and "expulsive zoning." Expulsive zoning refers to instances in which local
governments "downzoned" neighborhoods of color to allow incompatible, industrial uses.
Yale Rabin, Expulsive Zoning: The Inequitable Legacy of Euclid, ill ZONING AND THE
AMERICAN DREAM 101, 101-03, 106-18 (Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1989). An
example of how historic land use decisions have contributed to an inequitable distribution
of environmental amenities is provided in Miller v. City of Dallas, 2002 WL 230834 (N.D.
Tex. 2002). The plaintiffs in that case, residents of an African American community in
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recent study of seven cities, low-income, high-minority neighborhoods
are on the whole subject to more intensive zoning, allowing for
industrial and commercial uses, than high-income, low-minority
91
Likewise, current siting processes typically do not
neighborhoods.
account for inequities in income, education, political power, and social
capital among communities, disparities that often lead companies to site
noxious facilities in low-income communities or communities of color.
As Luke Cole and Sheila Foster argue, since "[s]tate permitting laws
remain neutral, or blind, toward these inequalities ... [they] perpetuate,
and indeed exacerbate, distributional inequalities." 92
While issues of distributive or social justice or fairness generally have
not been criteria in land use regulation, they should be. This goal may
93
be reached in a number of ways, a few of which are outlined below.
Several states have adopted so-called "anti-concentration" statutes,
which place substantive or special procedural limits on the number of
94
facilities that can be located in an area. In this vein, in 2001 California
adopted legislation mandating that guidelines for general plans
accomplish an equitable distribution of beneficial public services and
avoid over-concentration of industrial facilities near schools and
95
residences.
California land use law requires cities and counties to

Dallas, alleged unequal prOVISIOn of municipal services (flood protection, zoning,
protection from industrial nuisances, landfill practices, and streets and drainage), based on
the City of Dallas' long history of discriminatory zoning practices and their ongoing
impacts (Le., in the 1940's the city adopted ordinances prohibiting whites and blacks from
living together; its 1945 Master Plan concluded that because of flooding concerns there
should be no residential development in the area, a finding that was ignored when the city
later designated the area as a Negro subdivision).
91
Craig Anthony Arnold, Planning Milagros: Environmental Justice and Land Use
Regulation, 76 DENY. U. L. REV. 1,77-86 (1998).
92
COLE & FOSTER, supra note 2, at 7l.
93 As a theoretical matter, Professor Vicki Been has suggested various models of what
fairness in Siting could look like: (1) even apportionment of LULUs among all
neighborhoods; (2) compensation of communities hosting LULUs by other communities;
(3) progressive siting - wealthier neighborhoods receive more LULUs; (4) all communities
receive an equal number of vetoes that can be used to exclude a LULU; (5) cost
internalization - those who benefit bear the cost; (6) the siting process involves no
intentional discrimination; and (7) the siting process shows "equal concern and respect" for
all neighborhoods. Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got to Do With It? Environmental Justice and
the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001, 1008 (1993).
94
For example, in Arkansas, there is a presumption against the construction and
operation of any high impact solid waste management facility within 12 miles of any
existing similar facility. ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-6-1504 (Michie 2003). Alabama statutes
prohibit more than one commercial hazardous waste treatment facility or disposal site
within each county. ALA. CODE § 22-30-5.1 (2003).
95 CAL. GOV'TCODE § 65040.12 (West 2003).
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adopt a general plan guiding future development, composed of seven
required elements (housing, transportation, open space, etc.). The State's
draft guidelines provide that "[o]ver-concentration' occurs when
industrial facilities or uses do not individually exceed acceptable
regulatory standards for public health and safety, but when considered
cumulatively with other industrial facilities and uses, pose a significant
health and safety hazard to adjacent residential and school uses.,,96 They
also state that cities and counties "should plan for the equitable
distribution throughout the community of new public facilities and
services that increase and enhance communi~ quality of life" including,
parks, open space, and recreational facilities. 7 Prior to the adoption of
this legislation, some local governments in California had already added
"environmental equity" elements to their general plans. For instance, the
City of Los Angeles General Plan establishes as a goal of its land use
policies a "physically balanced distribution of land uses.,,98
Likewise, New York City's "Fair Share Ordinance" requires that the
selection of sites for city facilities "further the fair distribution among
communities of the burdens and benefits associated with city facilities.,,99
To implement the statute, New York City's Planning Commission
adopted "Fair Share Criteria" that require city agencies to consider the
distribution of similar facilities throughout the city, their compatibility
with existing neighborhood conditions, and the effect of such facilities on

96
CAL. OFFICE PLANNING & RESEARCH, GEN. PLAN GUIDELINES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT
(2002), at 21, available at http://www.opr.ca.gov /planning/PDFs/GPG_2002.pdf (last
visited Sept. 23, 2003). The Guidelines discuss the use of buffer zones or capping the
number of facilities within a certain distance of each other as among the ways to avoid
over-concentrating potentially hazardous facilities. Id.
91
Id. at 20. This latter requirement is an important recognition of the fact that
environmental amenities often have been distributed unfairly. Robert Garda, for example,
has documented the marked disparities in access to parks and recreation in Los Angeles
(which he notes has fewer acres of parks per 1,000 residents than any major city in the
country). Garcia points out that "[i)n the inner city where low income communities of
color live, there are .3 acres of parks per thousand residents, compared to 1.7 acres in
disproportionately white and relatively wealthy parts of Los Angeles. The paucity of
parkland is matched by the lack of recreational facilities. Within a five mile radius of [a)
planned Baldwin Hills state park, for example, in the historical heart of African-American
Los Angeles, there is one picnic table for every 10,000 people, one playground for 23,000
children, one soccer field for 30,000 people and one basketball court for 36,000 people."
Robert Garda, Building Community: Lessons from the Urban Parks Movement in Los Angeles
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author); see also Zenobia Lai, Andrew Leong & Chi
Chi Wu, The Lessons of the Parcel C Struggle: Reflections on Community Lawyering, 6 UCLA
ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 1,6-7 (Spring 2000) (noting that Boston's Chinatown has 0.6 acres of
open space per 1,000 residents, least amount of open space per resident in city).
98
CITY OF LOS ANGELES GENERAL PLAN ch. 3, goal 3A.
99
N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 203 (as amended through Nov. 2002).
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neighborhood character .100
As Professor Foster has described, other state laws that seek to
influence the distribution of unwanted facilities require that decision
makers consider so called "soft criteria" - i.e., factors other than the
technical design of a project or a quantitative assessment of its health
risks - in permit decisions. 101 Soft-criteria considerations include the
socioeconomic status of the host community, community perceptions,
psychic costs, the potential for change in property values, and the
cumulative health risks presented by other environmental sources in the
. 102
h ost commuruty.
These kinds of efforts to integrate environmental justice principles into
land use decisions have the potential to make environmental law fairer
and more ethical.
D. Reforming Environmental Review Statutes

Environmental review statutes such as the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) require federal agencies to analyze the effects of all
federal projects that have a significant environmental impact. Sixteen
states, plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, have adopted
similar statutes, known as state environmental policX acts (SEPAs), that
govern projects approved by state or local agencies. I NEPA or its state
analogues frequently will be implicated in permitting or other approval
processes that raise environmental justice concerns. Traditionally, these
statutes have not incorporated environmental justice principles, but they
should be revised to do so, in a number of ways. A few of these are
highlighted below.

100
N.Y. CITY PLANNING COMM'N, CRITERIA FOR THE LocATION OF CITY FACILmES 10
(Dec. 3, 1990). Michael Gerrard argues, however, that New York City's Fair Share program
has had little demonstrable impact on the dispersion of unpopular facilities, and in only
one reported case have plaintiffs prevailed in arguing that the siting of a facility violated
the Fair Share criteria. Michael B. Gerrard, Environmental Justice and Local Land Use
Decisionmaking, in TRENDS IN LAND USE LAW FROM A To Z, 135-136 (Patricia E. Salkin ed.,
2001).
101
Sheila Foster, Impact Assessment, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES
AND PROCEDURES TO ADDRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RIsKS 287-289 (Michael B. Gerrard ed.,
1999). Typically, however, there is no statutory guidance for the weight decision makers
must give these factors in the permitting process.

102

Id.

103

RECHTSCHAFFEN & GAUNA, supra note 2, at 309.
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1. Enhanced Public Participation

One idea, much discussed in recent years, is to enhance public
participation. NEPA requires agencies to provide for meaningful public
104
involvement in the environmental review process.
Environmental
justice advocates have advanced many thoughtful suggestions for
agencies to augment customary practices for public outreach (both in the
NEPA process and in other agency processes). These include, among
other ideas, soliciting public comments on environmental documents
through community, social service or religious organizations, or through
radio and television;l05 holding meetings at community-friendly times in
accessible locations; translating key documents into the language spoken
by the affected community;l06 establishing information repositories with
documents about the proposed action; and providing technical
assistance to interpret technical documents to help develop potential

104
Agencies must seek public input at various points in the NEPA process, such as
when determining the scope of what is to be included in an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) ("scoping"), after issuing draft EISs, and after issuing final EISs but before
final decisions have been made about the project. [d. at 310. Agencies also are required to
hold public hearings when there is substantial controversy surrounding a project or
substantial interest in a hearing. [d. They also are required to respond to all public
comments submitted on draft EISs. [d. To facilitate public review, NEPA's regulations
require that EISs must be written in "plain language ... so that decision makers and the
public can readily understand them." 40 C.F.R. § 1502.8 (2003). See RECHTSCHAFFEN &
GAUNA, supra note 2, at 310.
Ire See J. Brooks Christo 1, Tennessee Makes Strides on Environmental Justice Despite Budget
Shortfalls, Fall 2002 ECOStates 18, 18 (describing survey by Tennessee Dep't Environment &
Conservation finding that residents had strongest preference for receiving environmental
information
by
newspaper,
radio
or
television)
available
at
http://www.sso.org/ecos/publications/ECOStates.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2003).
106
One example in which a community was somewhat successful in arguing for
translation of an environmental impact report is described in Lai, et aI., supra note 97, at 2021. In that case, residents of Boston's Chinatown opposed a proposed plan to construct a
large parking garage for the New England Medical Center (NEMC) in their neighborhood.
[d. at 11. The Medical Center prepared a draft report solely in English, but after protest by
the community, translated a summary of the document into Chinese. [d. at 20. The
Massachusetts Secretary of Environmental Affairs also required that NEMC translate
"mearIingful" portions of any subsequent environmental reports. [d. at 21. In another
important case, a community group in Kettleman City, California, challenged a hazardous
waste facility under the state analogue to NEPA (the California Environmental Quality Act,
or CEQA) because the county refused to translate the environmental review documents
into Spanish. [d. The court ruled that translation of an extended summary of the
[Environmental Impact Report], public meeting notices, and public hearing testimony were
required because close to 40 percent of residents in the affected community were
monolingual in Spanish; the residents' "mearIingful involvement in the CEQA review
process was effectively precluded by the absence of the Spanish translation." El Pueblo
para el Aire y Agua Limpio v. County of Kings, 22 ENVTL L. REP. 20,357 (Sup. Ct.
Sacramento 1991).

122

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 37:95

alternatives and mitigation measures.107 A number of federal agencies
have significantly enhanced their community outreach efforts and public
participation programs along some of these suggested lines, both with
respect to NEPA and other processes. lOS A number of states have done
the same. For example, in 1999 Texas adopted legislation requiring that
the state environmental agency provide public notice of a permit upon
an application's completion, rather than when agency staff and the
applicant have finished negotiating the draft permit (and when, as a
practical matter, it is often too late for affected communities to obtain
meaningful changes in the design of a project).l09 In the first year after
the law took effect, the agency's public meetings increased from about 25
to 89, and the agency received comments on more than 15 percent of
l1O
total applications, rather than 10 percent in the prior year.
NEPA's requirement for meaningful public participation should also
extend to whether the environmental review process is free from racial
bias. Consider the example of Louisiana Energy Services' application to
site a uranium enrichment plant in Homer, Louisiana, approved by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).111
Community groups
challenging the decision in an administrative appeal presented evidence
that the NRC's review process was racially discriminatory, because at
each successive stage, the communities under consideration for the
project became poorer and more predominantly African American,

107
See generally, COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE:
GUIDANCE UNDER THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT (1997), available at
http://ceq.eh.doe.gov/nepa/regs/guidance.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2003); u.s. ENVT'L.
PROT. AGENCY, FINAL GUIDANCE FOR INCORPORATING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CONCERNS
IN EPA's NEPA COMPLIANCE ANALYSES (1998), available at http://www.epa.gov
Iresources/policies/ej/ej--8Uidance_nepa_epa0498.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2003);
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNCIL, NEJAC MODEL PuBLIC
PARTICIPATION PLAN, available at http://www.epa.gov/projectxl/nejac.htm#back (last
visited Sept. 23, 2003). See also CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 71113(b)(5) (West 2003) (requiring
Cal/EPA to recommend procedures to ensure that public documents, notices, and public
hearings "are concise, understandable, and readily accessible to the public" and guidance
for detennining when it is appropriate to translate crucial public documents, notices, and
hearings for limited-English speaking populations).
108
See Dennis Binder, et al., A Survey of Federal Agency Responses to President Clinton's
Executive Order No. 12898 on Environmental Justice, 31 ENVTL L. REP. 11,133, 11,138-39 (2001)
(describing overall community outreach and public participation efforts of federal agencies
in response to Executive Order No. 12898 on Environmental Justice).
109
See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN., § 382.056 (Vernon 2002).
110
NAT'L ACADEMY OF PuB. ADMIN, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN EPA PERMITTING:
REDUCING POLLUTION IN HIGH-RISK COMMUNITIES IS INTEGRAL TO THE AGENCY'S MISSION 38
(2001).
III
In re Louisiana Energy Services, L.P., 1998 NRC LEXIS, at *10-*11 (1998).
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culminating in the selection of a site that was 97 percent African
American and extremely poor.112 Expert testimony introduced in the
case also showed that the applicant's use of facially race-neutral siting
criteria to screen out alternatives - such as eliminating sites close to
sensitive receptors like hospitals, schools, and nursing homes disadvantaged poor and minority communities by reinforcing the impact
of prior discrimination that had left them without such institutions.1l3
The initial reviewing body found that this evidence raised a "reasonable
inference that racial considerations played some part in the site selection
1l4
process," and remanded the case for a more complete investigation.
Responding to the NRC's contention that its decision was based solely
on technical and business criteria, and that there was no specific
evidence that racial considerations motivated the decision, the reviewing
board wrote that racial discrimination "cannot be uncovered with only a
cursory review of the description of the [site selection process]. If it were
so easily detected, racial discrimination would not be such a persistent
and enduring problem in American society.,,115 On appeal, a panel of the
NRC reversed this part of the board's order, holding that NEPA is not
"a tool for addressing problems of racial discrimination.,,1l6 In the
panel's view, NEPA is limited to evaluating objective impacts, rather
than the subjective motives of the applicant or permitting agency.l17
The appellate decision in In re Louisiana Energy Services reflects an
unduly narrow view of NEP A, an act intended to place central
importance on procedure and meaningful public involvement in agency
decisions.1l8 For instance, how can federal decision makers "rigorously
explore ... all reasonable alternatives," as NEPA's implementing
guidelines require, if the selection of potential alternatives is infected
with racial bias?1l9 Such bias clearly can impede a truly meaningful
evaluation, by eliminating a host of potential alternatives from
consideration, even where the subjective motives of the permitting
agency are benign.
Especially given NEPA's focus on process,

112

m
114

See id. at *58.
See id. at *58-*60.
In re Louisiana Energy Services, 1997 LEXIS, at *55 (1997).

ld. at *54.
See In re Louisiana Energy Services, 1998 NRC LEXIS, at *60.
117 See id. at *62 (stating that Atomic Safety and Licensing Board's decision goes well
beyond what NEPA has traditionally been interpreted to require).
118
See, e.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.s. 332, 351 (1989)
(stating that NEP A merely prohibits uninformed, rather than unwise, agency action).
119
40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a) (2003).
115

116
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community groups should be able to require that an agency reconsider
its evaluation of alternatives when evidence demonstrates that the
agency's decision results from a racially biased process.
2. A More Refined Environmental Analysis
NEP A also should be interpreted to require agencies to prepare a more
refined (distributional) environmental analysis of the impacts of
proposed projects. Traditionally, agency environmental reviews have
not looked at particular subpopulations burdened by a project, but
rather analyzed the effects across the entire range of the affected public.
The Council on Environmental Quality's (CEQ) Environmental Justice
Guidance helpfully calls on agencies to determine whether an area
affected by a proposed project may include low income, minority, or
tribal populations, and whether the proposed action is likely to have a
12o
disproportionately high and adverse impact on these populations.
Another part of the Louisiana Energy Services case discussed above
provides an example of judicial application of this mandate. The
reviewing board in that case overturned as inadequate the
environmental review because the NRC did not take a more refined look
at which subgroups in the affected area would be harmed, and which
121
would be benefited, by the proposed uranium enrichment plant.
Specifically, the board found that the NRC had failed to examine the
impact of a proposed road closure on the very low-income Africanl22
American community that used the road as a pedestrian corridor. The
environmental analysis also failed to disaggregate the project's impact
l23
on property values.
While the analysis found that the project would
generally have beneficial effects on local housing values, it did not
examine the likely adverse impact on property values in the low-income
124
African-American community directly adjacent to the plant.
This mandate to take a "more refined look" at affected subgroups is
similar to the approach taken by EPA's Environmental Appeals Board in
reviewing permitting decisions by EPA under other environmental
statutes and the Executive Order on Environmental Justice. The Appeals
Board has ruled that when there is a plausible claim presented that a

120
See ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: GUIDANCE UNDER THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY ACT, supra note 107.
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In re Louisiana Energy Services, 1997 LEXIS, at *102-*03 (1997).
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[d. at *79.

123

Id. at *88-*89.
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proposed facility will have disproportionate effects on low-income
communities or communities of color, EPA should "take a more refined
look" at a project's health and environmental impacts, focusing on
smaller subpopulations, even if the facility does not pose a threat to a
broad cross-section of the community.l25
3. Cumulative Impact Analysis
NEPA requires that agencies evaluate the cumulative impact of
proposed projects. Cumulative impact, as defined by NEP A, is the sum
of the incremental impact of a proposed action when added to other
past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions. 126 NEP A's
requirement of a cumulative impact analysis is especially important from
an environmental justice perspective because almost no other pollution
control statute requires it; indeed, the failure of other statutes to consider
cumulative impacts is a major reason that, despite the protections
afforded by individual laws, disproportionate burdens occur in lowincome communities and communities of color. NEPA's cumulative
impacts requirement should be interpreted broadly by agencies to
include consideration of the existing concentration of industrial facilities
and other undesirable land uses in the affected neighborhood,
background community health conditions and health risks, and other
workplace and environmental exposures in the area.
CONCLUSION

Over the past decade, environmental justice has become a part of
the legal lexicon. And environmental justice principles - with their
compelling call for fairness in treatment and meaningful inclusion in
public processes - increasingly are becoming part of the environmental
decision-making fabric. As discussed in this Article, there are many
ways in which this trend can and should be reinforced. As these
principles become more central to environmental decision making, they
hold the promise of making environmental law more ethical.

125 See, e.g., In re Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 1995 EPA App. LEXIS 25, at '20
(1995). See generally, Richard J. Lazarus & Stephanie Tai, Integrating Environmental Justice
Into EPA Permitting Authority, 26 ECOL. L. Q. 617, 660-69 (1999).
126

40 c.F.R. § 1508.7 (2003).

